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1. Introduction 
Since the rise of modern bioethics, the usual approach to an assessment of the ethical 
issues relating to any new technology involves debates over the meanings of particular 
terms (for example, the differences, if any, between therapeutic and reproductive 
cloning), speculation as to the possible harms that may arise, and the application of 
various ethical theories to help decide how to use the technology in question. While this 
article is not the place to rehearse the problems with this kind of approach (Fox and 
Swazey 1984; Hoffmaster 1992, 1994), I want to show how an alternative, empirically 
based, take on the ethics of a particular technology (pharmacogenetics) strengthens the 
case made by those who claim that the social sciences have an important role to play in 
exploring the ethical issues surrounding new technologies (Haimes 2002; DeVries and 
Conrad 1998; Zussman 2000).  
 
The core theme of this kind of research is that the ethical problems associated with a 
particular technology can only be seen in the context in which that technology is actually 
used. Since most bioethical reasoning ‘strips away’ the, supposedly extraneous, 
background and context to any particular case, the kinds of ethical issues raised bear little 
relation to the actual problems faced by clinicians. As a result, having presented the 
ethical problems linked to pharmacogenetics, as seen by scientific commentators and 
bioethicists, this article then presents interview data with clinicians and researchers from 
Alzheimer’s disease and Breast cancer, to show how they view the ethics of 
pharmacogenetics. 
 
The broad theoretical structure for the research project this article comes from is a 
constructivist approach to the sociology of technology, summed up as the ‘social shaping 
of technology’ (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1987; Bijker and Law 1992).  But in the case 
of this particular article, the ideas underpinning my approach are derived from the work 
of James Lindemann Nelson and Robert Zussman, who raise important issues for how we 
assess the ethical impact of particular technologies.  In essence, this article is written in 
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reaction to the ‘linear model’ of bioethics decision making, where social scientists 
provide accurate and interesting descriptions of the lived clinical world, which 
philosophers then ‘programme’ into their ethical theories, to produce the finished ‘right’ 
(in two sense of the word) answer (Nelson 2000).  In such a model, the social scientist 
becomes “a junior partner to the philosopher, someone who responds to ideas generated 
elsewhere but who generates few if any of his or her own” (Zussman 2000:10).  
 
The alternative is a contextual approach, which assumes that ethical decisions are not 
made in some sort of vacuum, but arise in particular social, technical and cultural 
situations.  From this point of view, the place to start any enquiry into healthcare ethics is 
at the clinical ‘coalface’, where ethical decisions about, in this case, the use of genetic 
tests to govern the prescription of pharmaceutical products, are made.  By rooting 
analysis in the decisions that clinicians actually make, we can avoid the feeling that 
sometimes occurs with more philosophical bioethics, that clinicians exist in some sort of 
amoral desert until the bioethicist turns up to tell them what they should be doing.  The 
danger of the kind of approach used in this article is that one might lose the critical 
‘teeth’ that bioethics brings when it comes from outside a particular situation.  If our 
ethical assessment is rooted in a particular context, then we run the risk of conservatively 
simply supporting current clinical practice, regardless of its ethical impact (Zussman 
2000: 10). The trick is, as in so many cases, a question of balance. 
 
 
2. Pharmacogenetics: Science And Ethics 
Commentators 
One interesting part of the debate around pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics is the 
large number of review articles, or commentaries, written by academic and industry 
scientists. These articles do not present new research results, but rather act as a forum to 
discuss the direction this new technology is going in and the challenges that have to be 
faced if pharmacogenetics is to make its way into the clinic (Hedgecoe 2003). 
 
This is a pre-copy edited draft. Page numbers do not correspond with final version. 
Please do not distribute or cite 
 4
One important element of these commentaries is discussion of the ethical issues raised by 
pharmacogenetics; while not all these articles refer to ethical issues, it is not unusual to 
find a pharmacologist or senior pharmaceutical company scientist, writing in a science 
journal, speculating about the ethical impact the use of pharmacogenetics may have on 
clinical practice.  
 
For the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries the ethical issues associated with 
genetic testing are more than just simple talking points, elements of a background 
discourse. Since the backlash against genetically modified food in Europe, industry has 
become painfully aware of the possible problems that might arise from failing to take 
public opinion seriously. In the case of a new genetic technology like pharmacogenetics, 
the ethical debate is an integral part of bringing a product to market (Hedgecoe and 
Martin, 2003). One commentator goes so far as to suggest that the reasons why industry 
has been resistant to adopting pharmacogenetics as part of drug development lie with “the 
major societal and ethical considerations of DNA analysis and the regulatory impact of 
genetics analysis” (Jazwinska 2001: 202). 
 
The consistent theme in scientists’ discussion about the ethics of pharmacogenetics is the 
need to distinguish pharmacogenetics from other, usually more problematic, 
technologies. The first distinction is between genetic testing as a whole and more 
controversial technologies with the word ‘genetic’ in their name. As Allen Roses, Glaxo-
SmithKlines’s Vice-president for Genomics, and a major proponent of pharmacogenetics 
puts it: “This is not gene therapy or genetically modified foods or genetic engineering” 
(Roses 2000: 1361). An important element of this distinction is the need to educate the 
public: “The lessons learned from the public’s outcry to genetically modified food may 
help refine strategies...that are used to educate both the public and the healthcare 
professionals alike” (Akhtar 2002:299). 
 
This process of distinction continues as commentators seek to separate pharmacogenetics 
from ‘traditional’ genetic testing which focuses on disease risk and susceptibility.  It is 
regarded as “important to make a clear distinction between the ethical implications of 
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testing for disease predisposition...and those surrounding tests whose goal is simply to 
predict the effectiveness of therapies for existing conditions” (Pfost, Boyce-Jacino and 
Grant 2000:337). Sir Richard Sykes, Chairman of Glaxo-SmithKline, is clear about this 
when he suggests that “Pharmacogenetics applications will only measure how a patient 
will respond to a medicine. Thus they are quite distinct from those [genetic] tests 
considered over the past two decades” (Sykes 1999). 
 
The means by which distinction is most clearly drawn is on the grounds of novelty. 
Firstly, one can substitute a term like ‘pharmacogenomics’ for the more old fashioned 
(coined in 1959) ‘pharmacogenetics’. While there are no intrinsic differences between the 
two terms, the ‘-omics’ in pharmacogenomics implies novelty and a separation from what 
has gone before (Hedegcoe 2003). In addition, many of these review articles discuss the 
new technologies that will make pharmacogenetics cost effective and clinically practical: 
Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs), DNA arrays and bio-informatics. The exact 
nature of these new technologies is less important to the current argument than the fact 
that they are presented as revolutionary, novel spin-offs from the Human Genome 
Project. 
 
As in the previous case of distinguishing testing from GM crops, the motivation is a need 
to clarify issues for the public, lest they become confused, or panic: “Clear language and 
differentiation of respective ethical, legal and societal issues are required to prevent 
inaccurate vernacular usage creating a confused public perception of ‘genetic testing’ ” 
(Roses 2000: 1361). And this is a viewpoint that has already been tacitly accepted by, at 
least some regulators. The European Medical Evaluation Agency (EMEA) suggests that 
“It is important to distinguish between genetic testing for the diagnosis or prognosis of 
disease and the form of genetic testing performed for pharmacogenetics...generally 
carries a different magnitude of social, legal and ethical considerations for the patient” 
(EMEA 2000).  
 
Of course, one alternative to this is to accept that there may be important ethical problems 
with pharmacogenetics, but that they are over-ridden by the benefits that will arise: “the 
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great potential gains from pharmacogenomics, in terms of both patient well-being and 
cost of healthcare, heavily outweigh the risks” (McLeod and Evans 2001: 115). Linked to 
this is the idea that current restrictions on genetic information are preventing such 
benefits coming about: “Requirements for confidentiality and limitation of using this 
[genetic] data...place major constraints on our ability to generate meaningful 
data...Clearly the need for education, information, and teaching about genetics is large 
and evident, to put risks in perspective and illuminate the potential benefits of our 
growing knowledge” (Lindpaintner 1999: 487). One obvious ethical result of the benefits 
brought by pharmacogenetics is that “One day it may be considered unethical not to carry 
out such tests routinely to avoid exposing individuals to doses of drugs that could be 
harmful to them”  (Wolf, Smith and Smith 2000: 989)  
 
But it is important to note that some scientific commentators take quite different views 
and accept that “The pharmacogenomic approach is not without its challenges, not the 
least of which are the ethics questions surrounding the privacy of genetics data” 
(Anderson, Fitzgerald and Manasco 1999:267). One point made by these writers is that it 
is not necessarily the case that a clear line can be drawn between a pharmacogenetic test, 
and a test for disease susceptibility: “After all, polymorphisms relevant to drug response 
may overlap with disease susceptibility, and divulging such information could jeopardise 
an individual” (Sadée 1999:3). Such overlaps may well be the exception rather than the 
rule. After all “in pharmacogenomics we are normally only looking at genes in relation to 
a drug’s metabolism or mechanism of action” but this does not rule the possibility that 
“polymorphisms related to drugs could also be related to diseases” (Rioux 2000:896). 
 
Ethicists 
Although the ethical debates around pharmacogenetics are largely being set by scientific 
and commercial considerations (Hedgecoe and Martin 2003), this is not to say that 
bioethicists have not begun to explore some of the potential problems that may arise 
with this new technology. As a result, there are a number of articles focusing 
specifically on the possible ethical, issues raised by pharmacogenetics, as well as at 
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least one edited collection (Rothstein 2003), and two reports by committees, one in the 
US (Buchanan et al 2002.) and one in the UK (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2003).  
 
Most of these pieces emphasise the ethical issues involved in pharmacogenetic research, 
specifically, debates surrounding informed consent. Given that informed consent is a 
‘classic’ issue in clinical trials of all kind, this makes a great deal of sense. In the case of 
pharmacogenetics, the worries are that participants may not understand the reason their 
DNA is being sampled, or that the imprecise nature of much pharmacogenetic research 
means that by definition, it is not possible to give participants full information about the 
uses to which their DNA may be put. Related to this is the concern that if participants in a 
clinical trial are not given adequate privacy, then their genetic data may ‘leak’ into the 
broader community; even if this information is not relevant for disease diagnosis, it may 
still lead to social or financial stigmatisation (Rothstein and Epps 2001). One solution to 
this is to ensure that the participants’ DNA, personal and medical data are encoded or 
encrypted in such a way to prevent any infringement of privacy. But ‘full anonymisation’ 
(i.e. the removal of all identifiers, making tracing the participant all but impossible) 
prevents researchers feeding-back results to patients. Since “it could be argued that 
researchers have an obligation to pass useful research findings to study participants” 
(Clarke et al. 2001: 91), there is clearly a tension between two different sets of values. 
Researchers need to protect participants’ anonymity, while at the same time ensuring that 
any positive results from the trial can be fed back. This tension between the needs of the 
researchers and the protection of confidentiality or privacy crops up in a number of recent 
ethical reviews (Robertson, 2001; Issa, 2000; Vaszar, Rosen and Raffin 2002;  The 
Consortium on Pharmacogenetics, 2002). 
 
Ethicists have also, to a lesser degree, discussed the potential problems that may arise 
from the clinical application of pharmacogenetics. Although some authors do emphasise 
the possible personal implications of clinical pharmacogenetics such as the impact on 
insurance (e.g. Robertson, 2001; Clarke et al. 2001), most focus on the broader, systemic 
issues that will arise, such as physician (and pharmacist) education, the direct marketing 
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of pharmacogenetic tests to the public and possible issues of legal liability (The 
Consortium on Pharmacogenetics, 2002; Brushwood 2003; Palmer 2003). 
 
The aim of the rest of this paper is to explore the degree of overlap between the issues 
raised by bioethicists and scientific commentators, and the problems of pharmacogenetics 
faced by those clinicians who are beginning to use this technology. By comparing and 
contrasting the experiences, attitudes and values of those who are using 
pharmacogenetics with the opinions of those speculating about it, I hope to be able to 
orient ethical debates around this new technology towards clinical reality. At same time, 
although there are good reasons for focusing on the two case studies presented here, we 
should be cautious about thinking that these two instances will highlight all the ethical 
problems that will come with the clinical adoption of this new technology. 
Pharmacogenetics has to be seen as an extremely heterogeneous technology, and as a 
result, drawing sweeping generalisations about its social impact is rather difficult. 
 
 
3. Two Cases: Alzheimer’s Disease And Breast Cancer. 
The two case studies I explore in the rest of this article involve Alzheimer’s disease and 
Breast cancer. More specifically, they revolve around: a family of drugs called 
AcetylCholinesterase Inhibitors and the APOE gene, in Alzheimer’s; and the drug 
Herceptin and the HER2 gene in the case of breast cancer. These two cases cover a 
number of features that scientific commentators suggest occur in pharmacogenetics. In 
the case of Alzheimer’s, pharmacogenetics involves the retrospective application of 
genetic testing to already licensed products, an overlap between a ‘pharmacogenetic’ 
gene and a more traditional ‘disease gene’, with different companies having the rights to 
the drugs and the genetic test.  In contrast, Herceptin is a drug specifically designed to 
interact with a particular gene product, where the manufacturer of the drug also licenses 
the test and where the drug concerned has made it through the drug approval process as a 
pharmacogenetic product.  In addition both disease are widespread, and incur significant 
treatment costs.  If pharmacogenetics becomes commonly used in the clinic, it will be in 
these kinds of cases. 
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Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is a progressive neurological disorder characterised by a slow, 
steady deterioration in cognitive skills, such as language and memory, leading to 
depression, psychosis or other behavioural disturbances, and finally death. The risk of 
developing AD increases proportionally with age, with one estimate suggesting a 
prevalence of between 0.82 and 1.08% in over 65s in Europe, with the number of AD 
sufferers in the UK put at around half a million people and the current total cost in the US 
put at $100 Billion per year (Johnson, Davis and Bosanquet 2000). 
 
Although there are three clear familial types of AD, they account for less than 5% of all 
cases (Richard and Amouyel 2001). The vast majority of Alzheimer’s cases are 
‘sporadic’ in that the cause is unknown although possible risk factors have been listed as: 
age, previous head injury, ingesting Aluminium and particular versions of the protein 
apolipoprotein E (Richard and Amouyel 2001). This protein is coded for by the gene 
APOE on chromosome 19, and is involved in the regulation of cholesterol levels in the 
body. Three versions (or ‘alleles’) of the APOE gene have been identified (E2, E3 and 
E4) with APOE E4, which occurs in 15% of the population, associated with an increased 
risk of developing sporadic Alzheimer’s disease.1 
 
Although the exact mechanism is still a mystery, it is widely accepted among medical 
professionals and geneticists that homozygotes for E4 (i.e. people who carry two copies) 
have an increased of developing AD when compared to non-E4 carriers, as do 
heterozygotes for E4 (i.e. one copy) although to a lesser extent. There are also claims that 
when APOE E4 carriers develop Alzheimer’s disease, they do so earlier, and with a 
greater age-related decline than other cases of AD (Saunders et al 1993; Noguchi, 
Murakami and Yamada 1993; Smith 2000). 
 
                                                 
1
 Terminology around APOE can vary, but the convention seems to be that the protein, apolipoprotein E is 
shortened to apoe (i.e. lower case) while the gene involved is always uppercase APOE, with its different 
alleles referred to as E, or epsilon, or . 
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At the same time as researchers were connecting APOE4 to increased risk of Alzheimer’s 
disease, the pharmaceutical company Warner-Lambert was preparing to launch the first 
Alzheimer’s drug treatment.  Tacrine, as the product was called, is one of a family of 
compounds called acetyl cholinesterase (AChE) inhibitors, which act as symptomatic 
treatment for Alzheimer’s disease. Since Tacrine’s launch in 1993, three more drugs from 
the same family have been licensed: Donepezil (marketed as ‘Aricept’ by Pfizer); 
Rivastigmine (‘Exelon’; Novartis); and Galantamine (‘Reminyl’: Janssen). 
 
In 1995, a research team headed by Judes Poirier at McGill University announced that 
they had discovered a link between APOE status and response to Tacrine (Poirier et al. 
1995). It had always been a problem with Tacrine (and the other acetyl cholinesterase 
inhibitors) that there was a wide range of response to the drug, with up to 50% of patients 
not improving significantly when treated (Farlow et al 1992). What the McGill group had 
done was stratify the response rates from a clinical trial of Tacrine according to APOE 
status. They found that “>80% of apoE4-negative AD patients showed marked 
improvement after 30 weeks” whereas “60% of apoE4 patients were unchanged or worse 
after 30 weeks” (Poirier et al 1995: 12260 & 12263). As a result, APOE E4 status “may 
be a useful predictor to clinical outcome of...therapies” (Poirier et al 1995:12264). 
 
The Poirier paper has proved to be extremely popular with commentators on 
pharmacogenetics, described as “one of the most widely cited pharmacogenomic studies” 
(Evans and Johnson 2001: 27), and with the ISI science citation index showing that the 
1995 Poirier article has been cited over 265 times, including over  100 citations since the 
beginning of 2000. With some authors even suggesting that pharmacogenetic testing for 
APOE4 is currently in use in the clinic (Ensom, Chang and Patel 2001), Alzheimer’s 
disease would seem to be a good example to test clinicians’ attitudes towards the ethics 
of pharmacogenetics.2  
                                                 
2
 This story is complicated by the fact that very few of the clinicians I spoke to believe that there is a link 
between APOE status and response to Tacrine.  There are a number of reasons for this, including 
replication failures, the phasing out of Tacrine in clinical treatment, and ethical worries on the part of 
clinicians. However the Poirier paper has stimulated a great deal of interest in this area, and all new 
Alzheimer’s drugs are tested for a pharmacogenetic link to E4 in clinical trials, with  a number of possible 
candidates coming through. 
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My second case study, that of breast cancer, is rather different from Alzheimer’s disease. 
To start with, the drug involved, Herceptin, was developed with the intention of being 
prescribed to a genetically identified sub-group of patients; Herceptin was always seen as 
a pharmacogenetic drug. Initially developed by the biotech firm Genentech, Herceptin is 
now marketed in Europe by Roche, and currently has sales of £460 million a year, 
making it Roche’s fifth biggest selling drug (Guardian 2003). As the first 
pharmacogenetic drug licensed in the US (in 1998) and the UK (a year later), Herceptin is 
often cited as a pharmacogenetic success story, although such a claim rather glosses over 
the number of times the drug was almost cancelled during development (Bazell 1998).  
 
Initially, some industry scientists baulked at the idea of Herceptin being described as 
pharmacogenetics, or pharmacogenomics. For them, the fact that HER2 testing measures, 
in the first instance at least, protein levels, and that the genetic component (HER2 over-
expression) is not an inherited genetic difference makes Herceptin as case of “not quite 
pharmacogenomics” (Haseltine 1998; Rusnak et al 2001: 304). Others have described this 
as “a difficult argument to follow” suggesting that it is “neither helpful [n]or meaningful” 
(Lindpaintner et al 2001: 77). An increasing number of scientists seem quite happy to cite 
Herceptin as an example of pharmacogenetics (e.g. Sadee 1999; Shi, Bleavins and Iglesia 
2001; Ginsburg and McCarthy 2001; Akhtar 2002). And it is clearly a good enough 
example of pharmacogenomics to be so described in an editorial by the editors of Nature 
Biotechnology (Anon, 1998). 
  
Herceptin is designed to neutralise large amounts of a protein called Human Epidermal 
growth factor Receptor 2, or HER2. This protein, and the gene that codes for it (also 
called HER2) are present in normal human tissue, and play a vital role in controlling cell 
division and growth. In upto 30% of breast cancers, the body appears to making far too 
much HER2 protein, which in turn stimulates tumour growth and produces a more 
aggressive form of cancer, associated with more relapses and worse prognosis. Herceptin 
interferes with HER2 over-expression and stimulates the immune system to attack HER 
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overexpressing cells, and though not a cure, the drug reduces tumour size and improves 
live expectancy. 
 
Exactly why some people’s HER2 genes begin to over-express is not clear, but it seems 
to be the result of an external factor: HER2 over-expression is not an inherited feature of 
people’s genomes, and is thus not something that can be passed from mother to daughter. 
Because HER2 status is a feature of the tumour, HER2 testing involves use of breast 
biopsy material (usually taken upon initial diagnosis). The first line of testing, 
immunohistochemistry (IHC) uses antibodies to detect HER2 protein levels in a slice of 
biopsy material. If this test is unclear, then Fluorescent In-Situ Hybrydisation (FISH), 
which detects levels of the HER2 gene is used. 
 
 
 
4. Themes 
What do you tell people?  
Respecting patients’ autonomy in making decisions over treatment, and getting their 
‘informed consent’ is at the core of modern medical ethics. Both in terms of the rules laid 
down for ethical clinical practice (Levine 1988; Smith, 1999) and in philosophically 
based medical ethics (e.g. Beauchamp and Childress 2001), the need to get informed 
consent from patients is crucial. Yet a considerable amount of empirical research 
suggests just how hard it is to decide exactly what counts as ‘informed’ consent (see 
Sugarman et al 1999 for a bibliography). And this is certainly a question raised by my 
interviews. More importantly, what happens when informed consent comes up against 
other values, which are perhaps equally deeply rooted in a particular clinical community? 
 
Even before I began interviewing, I could spot a possible ethical problem to do with the 
use of APOE4 testing in the clinic for pharmacogenetic purposes. Since the elucidation of 
the link between APOE4 and increased risk of late-onset AD, the professional 
community surrounding Alzheimer’s has been extremely resistant to the use of APOE 
testing in the clinic. The argument goes that the test is only for a risk factor: there are 
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many people, between 23 – 68%, with Alzheimer’s who do not carry the APOE4 allele, 
and many E4 carriers who never develop Alzheimer’s, the test can play no useful part in 
clinical diagnosis or treatment (Ritchie and Dupuy 1999). Over the years there have been 
a number of professional consensus meetings which have re-affirmed this point (Farrer, 
Brin, Elsas et al. 1995; Brodaty, Conneally, Gauthier, et al. 1995; Relkin, Kwon, Tsai and 
Gandy 1996; Post, Whitehouse, Binstock, et al. 1997; McConnell, Koenig, Greely and 
Raffin 1998; The Ronald and Nancy Reagan Research Institute of the Alzheimer’s 
Association and the National Institute on Aging Working Group 1998). For most 
professionals working in Alzheimer’s disease, the clinical use of APOE 4 testing is 
irresponsible and unethical. 
 
Yet despite the high profile nature of this consensus position, the ethical issues involved 
in introducing a pharmacogenetic test for APOE4 into the clinic seem to have escaped the 
notice of most of those commentators only too happy to cite Alzheimer’s disease, APOE 
and Tacrine as a good example of pharmacogenetics.3 From talking to clinicians involved 
in the treatment and care of, as well as research into, Alzheimer’s patients, it is clear that 
these ethical problems have not escaped their notice. This is perhaps best illustrated by 
the mini-scenario painted for me by my interviewee Clinician-Researcher 4, who acted 
out both sides of the following conversation: 
 
“Supposing you know that lack of APOE4 predicts response, if you do this, and 
depending on what age group etc. you do their APOE4 and you find out they’re 
3/4, or 2/4 or 4/4: 
‘Right, sorry you’re not getting treatment.’ 
‘Well, why am I not getting treatment?’ 
‘Because of your genotype that doesn’t respond.’ 
‘Well, what is that genotype?’ 
‘OK, so it’s 4/4.’ 
                                                 
3
 An exception to this is Patrice Rioux, who notes that “a person’s apoliopoprotein E genotype could have 
an impact on drug treatment by acetylcholinesterase inhibitors but also seems to be a risk factor for early 
onset of Alzheimer’s disease” (Rioux 2000: 896).  On the bioethics front, Issa and Keyserlingk (2000) 
provide a detailed discussion. 
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‘What does that genotype mean then? 
You won’t get this from the patients. Sometimes when it’s Alzheimer’s, you get it 
from the family  
‘What does that mean then?’ 
‘APOE4 is associated with a worse vascular outlook and, really, worse 
prognosis in AD’ 
 
Even if you don’t tell them, if they know the genotype, the family will be away 
[mimes typing at computer], downloading from whatever [web]site. And we see 
that and you can’t blame them for that”. 
 
And it is this threat to the families of patients that seems to underpin this kind of 
resistance to pharmacogenetics. As another interviewee puts it: “once you genotype 
somebody for APOE4, for pharmacogenetics, they would then have access to that 
result...and then that information becomes known to the rest of the family. And they then, 
from that information can infer some element of risk” (AD Researcher 1). But why 
should we be concerned if the families of Alzheimer’s patients learn something about 
their parent’s genotype, and hence, possibly about their own genetic risk? And how much 
information could a family member get from such a test? 
 
To answer the second question first: if “you test patient X and you find he’s E4/E4, well 
then you immediately know that all his children are carrying an E4 allele. So you 
immediately know they’ve all got a 4 times increased risk of getting Alzheimer’s 
Disease” (AD Clinician Researcher 1). The trouble comes when one tries to interpret 
what the idea of a ‘four times risk’ means. It would be easy to see clinicians’ resistance to 
allowing access to this kind of information as paternalistic, if not patronising, towards the 
capabilities of members of the public. It may well be just that, but if, so it is an attitude 
they also have with regard to their medical colleagues: 
“it’s difficult for me to even impart the information to psychiatrists.  In fact, just 
before you came, someone said ‘oh, I’ve got someone who’s got a family history, 
can we do their E4?’  And I said ‘well, why?’ Literally they’ve got the blood in 
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their hand and I said ‘well why are you doing it?’  And I’d just given a talk on 
this, a week ago.  They can’t work it out, they can’t work out why I’m saying it’s 
of no value...” (AD Clinician Researcher 7) 
 
In addition to this, a number of interviewees mentioned difficulties that would arise if 
insurance companies were to get hold of the results of these pharmacogenetic tests. It is 
quite conceivable that if APOE4 testing was used to guide treatment decisions, then 
companies might pay attention to the offspring of people with Alzheimer’s who did not 
receive acetylcholinesterase inhibitors. The assumption would that their parent is at least 
an APOE4 heterozygote, if not a homozygote, and thus their children are at increased risk 
of carrying the E4 allele themselves, and hence of developing Alzheimer’s.  The issue of 
genetic testing and insurance has a long history in the bioethics literature, and these 
clinicians’ concerns obviously tie into to this. They are also at odds with the perspective 
of those scientific commentators who claim that pharmacogenetic testing is ‘not like’ 
disease gene testing, and that it needs to be assessed in different ways. 
 
In contrast to this, the breast cancer clinicians I spoke to expressed no particular concern 
over the use of HER2 testing, and did not feel the need to inform their patients of exactly 
what was going to happen. When asked whether they told patients about Herceptin, prior 
to tissue being sent to the pathology lab for IHC screening, many of the clinicians I spoke 
to stated that they did not: “The current procedures are that if you've got a tumour, the 
pathologist can do what he wants to it, no one ever suggests that he should ask the patient 
for permission to do it” (Her2 Clinician Researcher 12 ). 
 
The point is that when a tumour biopsy is done, patients are told that a number of 
different tests will be run on this material. The question is, why should a HER2 test be 
singled out for specific attention?  One answer might be that HER2 status is known to be 
a prognostic factor, and that patients may wish to know that such a ‘predictive’ test is 
being carried out. The problem is, that most of the tests carried out on tumour material 
have some prognostic role:  
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“At the moment we look at lymph-node status, we look at tumour size, we look at 
tumour grade, of course we know the age of the patient, so in there we’ve got 
quite a lot of prognostic information and we discuss treatment plans with the 
patient in the light of that prognostic information” (HER Clinician Researcher 8).  
In that sense, information on HER2 “will just be added into the equation, trying to make a 
more accurate determination of what that individual’s prognosis is” (HER Clinician 
Researcher 1). 
  
While much of the literature about Herceptin suggests that HER2 over-expression is a 
powerful predictor of disease outcome, it seems to play a much lower-key role in the 
decision-making processes of these clinicians:  
“it’s not like the difference between being node-negative and node-positive, or 
having a grade 3 rather than a grade 1 tumour, I think it [giving HER2 status] is a 
needless complication of managing people who are already over-loaded with 
information. Information over-loading in cancer patients is beginning to be a big 
issue, I think” (HER Clinician Researcher 6). 
 
This is in direct contrast to what little writing there has been on the ethics of Herceptin 
which has tended to highlight the special nature of HER2 testing:  
“as soon as a patient with breast cancer submits her trastuzamab [Herceptin] 
prescription, the pharmacist and the cashier, as well as the data entry clerk, the 
claims adjuster, and any number of additional personnel involved in health care 
administration and reimbursement will by inference, know that patient’s HER-2-
expressor status” (Lindpaintner, Foot, Caulfield, and Hall 2001: 81) 
 
For clinicians in the UK’s National Health Service, at least, there is little support for this 
kind of exceptionalism in the case of HER2 testing, which is seen as just adding more 
information to the prognostic process, rather than being a make-or-break test.  Rather 
than assuming that ethical theory can settle this debate, perhaps coming down on the side 
of those commentators who feel that HER2 testing is somehow privileged, a contextual 
perspective will try and see the problem from ‘inside-out’. We could claim that the 
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clinicians’ attitudes towards what they tell patients are a simple example of good old 
fashioned paternalistic medical practice, exactly the kind of thing that medical ethics has 
been fighting against for the past few decades. Alternatively we could see things from the 
clinicians’ perspective; by not informing their patients about the nature of the test their 
tissue is about to undergo, their ethical position is underpinned by both practical and 
epistemological considerations.  
 
Epistemologically, a HER2 test, although a genetic test, is not a test for a gene like 
APOE4.  HER2 over-expression is not inherited, and the result of an individuals’ test tells 
us nothing about their relatives’ chances of developing HER2 over-expressing breast 
cancer. APOE4 is inherited, and thus carries with it quite different ethical concerns. 
Given this status, quite understandable practical considerations result: if HER2 does not 
carry with it particular ethical problems, then why should clinicians single it out from the 
range of other tests run on breast tissue?  If it is not singled out then either nothing is said 
at all, or alternatively, clinicians ought to give their patients in-depth information about 
each and every test that is going to be performed on their biopsy.  This in turn raises 
issues about how clinicians should best use their time.  In the light of these practical 
considerations, current clinical practice, where patients are informed that some test will 
be run on their material, but the specific nature of these tests is not spelled out begins to 
make more ‘ethical sense’. 
 
Beyond this, the ethical status of a test is tentative and contingent, dependent in part on 
whether there is a form of intervention that could be used.  For clinicians and others 
working with Herceptin, such as Pharmacists, one of the most important justifications for 
the use of HER2 testing is that it then leads onto an intervention.  Simply testing a tumour 
for HER2 status, without access to Herceptin, is of little use:  
“there's a world of difference between testing something which might predict the 
likelihood of a disease or course of that disease when you can't do anything about 
it, and testing for something because it dictates how you treat something, so it is 
interesting...it still does have implications; things like insurance and people's 
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mental well-being, suddenly changes when you actually have an intervention you 
can make” (Her2 Pharmacist 2). 
 
Viewed from within the clinic, the availability of an intervention changes the moral status 
of a diagnostic test:  
“in the UK [testing] just hasn't [taken off]... because people can say well we don't 
really think it makes a difference to management, then there wasn't the mentality 
to do it.  Now I think we have to because you need to know whether that patient 
down the road is someone who might benefit from the licence indication of the 
drug” (Her2 Clinician-researcher 4). 
 
Yet even the ethical role of interventions depends upon the context.  In the case of 
Alzheimer’s disease, even if the test aids the use of an intervention, the professional 
ethical consensus still resists it’s application.   
 
Trust in Numbers: 
The second theme that comes out of empirical research into the ethics of 
pharmacogenetics, is who gets access to new treatments, and how are these decisions 
made.  In the case of Alzheimer’s disease, a major reason for resistance to 
pharmacogenetics offered up by Alzheimer’s professionals is the weakness of the link 
between APOE4 and non-response to Tacrine. The original Poirier study found that 60% 
of APOE4 carriers failed to respond to Tacrine after 30 weeks, which means that 40% the 
carriers did respond. Since E4 carriers make up between 55-70% of Alzheimer’s patients, 
using genetic testing to screen-out E4 carriers as ‘non responders’ could deny what are 
still the only licensed drugs for this condition to two-thirds of all patients, when 40% of 
them (perhaps 28% of the total) may respond. 
 
As far as the clinicians I spoke to were concerned, these kinds of odds are not good 
enough to deny someone treatment: “Even if there was a 20%, a 10% chance of someone 
going to get a benefit, well if you were that individual, or closely related to that 
individual, you’d probably take your chance” (AD Clinician Researcher 5).  Having to 
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rule patients out on statistical grounds is not a phenomenon new to medicine of course, 
and as such, we have to set pharmacogenetics within the larger context of current clinical 
practice:  
“We already know there are people who are 20% less likely to respond to all sorts 
of things but we always give the hope that they might. So at what point does it 
become clinically acceptable not to give a drug to somebody who is marginally 
less likely or even significantly less likely to respond?” (AD Clinician Researcher 
3) 
 
Of course prescribing policies get set by healthcare providers and funders, and my 
interviewees accept that “if there were definitive tests that would predict response on a 
genetic basis, you would get a pressure on from above, at health authority and 
government level to focus prescribing” (AD Clinician Researcher 4). And such decisions, 
made at the population level, “needn’t necessarily be congruent with the wishes and 
needs of the individual, or people closely related to that individual”  (AD Clinician 
Researcher 5). In this sense, the needs of the individual patient are in conflict with those 
of society at large. 
 
In the case of Herceptin, the pharmacogenetic product is currently being prescribed by 
clinicians, so in many ways it is subject to the kinds of bureaucratic pressures these 
interviewees are talking about.  These go beyond the issues involved in any normal 
expensive treatment; the point about pharmacogenetics is that a test will be required for 
the drug to be prescribed properly.  As a result, the current devolution of budgets within 
healthcare providers can cause problems: “although the Trust has given us funding for the 
drug, they haven’t given us any funding for the HER-2 testing so... we’re struggling at 
the moment to try and get some funding for our pathology department to go on to do the 
HER-2 testing which is not something that’s being done routinely” (HER2 Clinician 
Researcher 1). It is of course ironic that in this case there is enough money for the 
relatively expensive treatment, but no budget for the test. 
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There are several levels at which Herceptin is controlled and limited, largely on economic 
grounds.  For reasons of both space and the focus of this article, I will concentrate on one 
particular, clinician lead, approach, which is that of the ‘named prescriber’.  In this 
approach, only a limited number of clinicians in a specific area (covering hospitals 
sharing the same budget) are deemed expert enough to actually prescribe Herceptin:  
“Within [our area], we’ve actually said that the only two people who should 
instigate prescribing are Dr. Parker and Dr. Cassidy [pseudonyms].  So, we’re 
actually trying to control the initiation of Herceptin so that we make sure that 
people are actually FISH 3 positive, have been properly tested, have been through 
the other options” (Her2 Pharmacist 1). 
 
For the clinicians, this is a solution still allowing their patients access to an expensive 
drug (£20,000 per year), but displaying a degree of financial responsibility, and 
forstalling potential attempts from healthcare managers to restrict Herceptin prescription 
on other grounds.  This strategy has echoes of Robert Zussman’s assessment of the 
tension between financial and medical duties in US based Managed-care organisations, 
often deemed as morally suspect in bioethical literature:  
“physicians do not, for the most part, act as the profit-maximising individuals 
beloved of classical economic theory...financial incentives...become important 
only within a collective context as networks of physicians elaborate those 
incentives into a culture of practice” (Zussman 2000: 9). 
 
Here the problem is the inverse of that in Alzheimer’s disease: rather than clinicians 
being resistant to a new technology, breast cancer clinicians are keen to prescribe 
Herceptin, though they realise this needs to be done in such a way as to be acceptable to 
healthcare funders. 
 
Conclusions 
What this small selection of data from my interviews suggests is that introducing 
pharmacogenetics into the clinic maybe a far more complicated procedure than most 
commentators seem to admit. The central point is that there is always a context to a 
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pharmacogenetic test when it enters a clinical situation. In the case of Alzheimer’s 
disease, this context includes a decade’s-worth of debate and restriction on the clinical 
use of APOE testing, as well as broader medical debates over rationing and evidence 
based medicine.  Herceptin has had a smoother ride, and has made it into the clinic; the 
ethical problems are very different, partly because of the nature of the genetic test, but 
also because breast cancer clinicians use significantly more testing than old age 
psychiatrists.  The clinical culture, and thus the ethical issues raised, is quite different.  
Yet to read most of the literature on pharmacogenetics, while there might be ethical 
problems with developing products and the storage of genetic material, the actual clinical 
use of testing is presented as relatively unproblematic. 
 
The contextual approach to ethical issues that I advocated at the beginning of this article 
turns traditional bioethics on its head: rather than coming to a technology with a set of 
concepts or an ethical theory in hand, this approach starts from the clinical experience, 
looking at the ethical aspects of pharmacogenetics as seen by those people beginning to 
use this new technology.  We then need to move outwards, beyond the particular case, to 
see whether these cases have anything to teach us about theory. 
 
The strongest theoretical element that comes out of this discussion is the role of 
clinicians’ ‘resistance’ to various aspects of pharmacogenetics.  In this context, I am 
borrowing Beeson and Doksum’s development of Foucault’s ideas, with resistance being 
a political terms referring to “elements of discourse that seem to conflict with or evade 
more dominant assumptions and priorities” (Beeson and Doksum, 2000: 155).  In the 
case of Alzheimer’s disease, clinicians resistance centres on the actual introduction of the 
technology itself, while in Breast Cancer, clinicians are largely welcoming of Herceptin 
as a new weapon in their armoury against cancer.  In this case, the resistance focuses on 
the nature of the Her2 test, with clinicians rejecting the notion that it is in some way 
special or different.  But both sets of professionals are extremely knowledgeable about 
the treatment being proposed, and it is this aspect of ‘knowledgeable resistance’. 
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When faced with professional resistance to new technologies, a common response from 
supporters of genomics is to suggest that there is need for ‘education’ on the part of 
doctors and other medics (this obviously echoes the need to inform the public about the 
different and safe nature of pharmacogenetics).  For example, when faced with research 
that claims that GPs are distinctly unexcited about the introduction of genetic testing into 
the clinic because of time constraints and the limited occurrence of Mendelian genetic 
disease (Kumar 1999; Kumar and Gantley 1999) supporters of technology claim that 
more complex genetic technologies (led by pharmacogenetics) will inevitably enter 
primary care, and there is thus a need for GPs “to become genetically literate” (Emery 
and Hayflick 2001: 1027).  
 
But this cry for genetic literary looks a bit odd in the light of my research data.  All the 
clinicians and clinician-researchers I interviewed were extremely genetically literature. 
Some of the people I spoke to had been involved in the early studies of APOE and 
Alzheimer’s risk. Yet these people were also highly resistant to aspects of 
pharmacogenetics. At the very least this undermines the, frankly simplistic, idea that to 
get professionals to engage with a new technology, we just have to educate them about it.  
Professional resistance, if it is to be overcome, can only be dealt with by actually 
engaging with those ethical and structural issues that professionals are concerned about. 
 
When we think about how new technologies get implemented in the clinic, and the 
ethical problems that may arise, we need to bear a number of points in mind.  In the same 
way that pharmacogenetics is a reaction against the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to 
pharmaceutical prescription, it may make sense to accept that the varied and contingent 
nature of different clinical cultures means that a similar approach to the ethical problems 
raised by pharmacogenetics may not be that productive.  To assume that a broad and 
heterogeneous technology like pharmacogenetics will be problematic in the same way, 
where ever it is used, is a touch simplistic.  Even the theoretical concept of ‘resistance’ 
cannot be unequivocally applied to all examples of the technology.  Will clinicians resist 
pharmacogenetics when it is used to avoid potentially lethal adverse drug reactions?  
Maybe, but it is hard to say for sure.   
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As a result, we need to approach the ethical issues raised by pharmacogenetics on a case 
by case basis, mapping out the kinds of problems that arise when the technology is used, 
rather than adding to the already expansive speculations surrounding this technology. 
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